This paper shows why Kant's critique of empirical psychology should not be read as a scathing criticism of quantitative scientific psychology, but has valuable lessons to teach in support of it. By analysing Kant's alleged objections in the light of his critical theory of cognition, it provides a fresh look at the problem of quantifying first-person experiences, such as emotions and sense-perceptions. An in-depth discussion of applying the mathematical principles, which are defined in the Critique of Pure Reason as the (...) constitutive conditions for mathematical-numerical experience in general, to inner sense will demonstrate why it is in principle possible to justify a quantitative structure of psychological judgments on the grounds of Kant's critical thinking. In conclusion, it will propose how Kant's critique could be used in a constructive way to develop first steps towards a transcendental foundation of psychological knowledge. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungEin gelungenes Arzt-Patient-Verhältnis, das auf gegenseitigem Vertrauen und ärztlicher Verantwortung basiert, ist ein zentraler Bestandteil des Ideals der ärztlichen Profession. Aktuell wird vielfach von einem neuen „ökonomischen Paradigma“ in der Medizin gesprochen, das dieses Verhältnis vermeintlich unterminiert. Als ein wichtiges Merkmal dieses Paradigmas gilt das Verständnis vom Patienten als Kunden, der charakterisiert ist durch seine Selbstbestimmung bzw. Autonomie. Wie stellt sich die Kundenrolle nun aber bei vulnerablen Patientengruppen dar, die in ihrer Autonomie eingeschränkt sind, und was bedeutet dies wiederum für (...) das Arzt-Patient-Verhältnis? In dem vorliegenden Artikel wollen wir deshalb die Fragestellung verfolgen, ob sich ärztliche Verantwortung bzw. das Arzt-Patient-Verhältnis ändert, wenn sich der (vulnerable) Patient als Kunde begreift. Als Analysesetting dient die Palliativmedizin, da sie als Beispiel für eine besonders vulnerable Patientengruppe gelten kann. Als Basis der Argumentation werden die Ergebnisse einer qualitativen Studie herangezogen, welche die Einstellungen von Palliativpatienten zum Thema „der Patient als Kunde“ erhob sowie der Frage nachging, ob sich Palliativpatienten, speziell im Rahmen von medizinischen Entscheidungen, als selbstbestimmt begreifen. Die Studienergebnisse zeigen, dass Autonomie relational verstanden werden muss und dem Arzt eine entscheidende Rolle in der Ermöglichung von Patientenselbstbestimmung zukommt – ganz unabhängig von der Selbstattribuierung der Befragten als Kunde oder Patient. Anschließend werden diese Ergebnisse dahingehend analysiert, ob sie als Ausdruck einer Veränderung des Arzt-Patient-Verhältnisses und der ärztlichen Verantwortung gegenüber den Patienten zu werten sind. Hieraus folgernd wird nach den praktischen Implikationen für das Arzt-Patient-Verhältnis auf der Grundlage der „Ethics of Care“ gefragt sowie auf die individuelle Betreuungsnotwendigkeit, speziell von vulnerablen Patientengruppen, verwiesen. (shrink)

Ein gelungenes Arzt-Patient-Verhältnis, das auf gegenseitigem Vertrauen und ärztlicher Verantwortung basiert, ist ein zentraler Bestandteil des Ideals der ärztlichen Profession. Aktuell wird vielfach von einem neuen „ökonomischen Paradigma“ in der Medizin gesprochen, das dieses Verhältnis vermeintlich unterminiert. Als ein wichtiges Merkmal dieses Paradigmas gilt das Verständnis vom Patienten als Kunden, der charakterisiert ist durch seine Selbstbestimmung bzw. Autonomie. Wie stellt sich die Kundenrolle nun aber bei vulnerablen Patientengruppen dar, die in ihrer Autonomie eingeschränkt sind, und was bedeutet dies wiederum für (...) das Arzt-Patient-Verhältnis? In dem vorliegenden Artikel wollen wir deshalb die Fragestellung verfolgen, ob sich ärztliche Verantwortung bzw. das Arzt-Patient-Verhältnis ändert, wenn sich der (vulnerable) Patient als Kunde begreift. Als Analysesetting dient die Palliativmedizin, da sie als Beispiel für eine besonders vulnerable Patientengruppe gelten kann. Als Basis der Argumentation werden die Ergebnisse einer qualitativen Studie herangezogen, welche die Einstellungen von Palliativpatienten zum Thema „der Patient als Kunde“ erhob sowie der Frage nachging, ob sich Palliativpatienten, speziell im Rahmen von medizinischen Entscheidungen, als selbstbestimmt begreifen. Die Studienergebnisse zeigen, dass Autonomie relational verstanden werden muss und dem Arzt eine entscheidende Rolle in der Ermöglichung von Patientenselbstbestimmung zukommt – ganz unabhängig von der Selbstattribuierung der Befragten als Kunde oder Patient. Anschließend werden diese Ergebnisse dahingehend analysiert, ob sie als Ausdruck einer Veränderung des Arzt-Patient-Verhältnisses und der ärztlichen Verantwortung gegenüber den Patienten zu werten sind. Hieraus folgernd wird nach den praktischen Implikationen für das Arzt-Patient-Verhältnis auf der Grundlage der „Ethics of Care“ gefragt sowie auf die individuelle Betreuungsnotwendigkeit, speziell von vulnerablen Patientengruppen, verwiesen. (shrink)

As the pre-eminent Enlightenment philosopher, Kant famously calls on all humans to make up their own minds, independently from the constraints imposed on them by others. Kant's focus, however, is on universal human reason, and he tells us little about what makes us individual persons. In this book, Katharina T. Kraus explores Kant's distinctive account of psychological personhood by unfolding how, according to Kant, we come to know ourselves as such persons. Drawing on Kant's Critical works and on (...) his Lectures and Reflections, Kraus develops the first textually comprehensive and systematically coherent account of our capacity for what Kant calls 'inner experience'. The novel view of self-knowledge and self-formation in Kant that she offers addresses present-day issues in philosophy of mind and will be relevant for contemporary philosophical debates. It will be of interest to scholars of the history of philosophy, as well as of philosophy of mind and psychology. (shrink)

This article advocates a new interpretation ofinner experience– the experience that one has of one’s empirical-psychological features ‘from within’ – in Kant. It argues that for Kant inner experience is the empirical cognition of mental states, but not that of a persistent mental substance. The schema of persistence is thereby substituted with the regulative idea of the soul. This view is shown to be superior to two opposed interpretations: the parity view that regards inner experience as empirical cognition of a (...) mental object on a par with outer experience and the disparity view that denies altogether that inner experience is empirical cognition. (shrink)

Kant’s theory of cognition centrally builds on his conception of self-consciousness and the transcendental use of the phrase “I think”: the ability to add the phrase “I think” to a representation is a necessary condition of the ability to cognize objects. The paper argues that “I think”, rather than denoting the content of a predicative judgement, is typically an expression of the subject’s thinking. It expresses a kind of self-consciousness that, without assertively representing the subject itself, indicates that representational contents (...) are unified in a single consciousness of a single subject. Our aim is thus to develop and defend an expressivist interpretation of Kant’s “I think”. (shrink)

This paper examines whether Kant’s Critical philosophy offers resources for a conception of empirical psychology as a theoretical science in its own right, rather than as a part of applied moral philosophy or of pragmatic anthropology. In contrast to current interpretations, this paper argues that Kant’s conception of inner experience provides relevant resources for the theoretical foundation of scientific psychology, in particular with respect to its subject matter and its methodological presuppositions. Central to this interpretation is the regulative idea of (...) the soul, which supplies principles of systematicity at different levels. Firstly, the idea defines the way in which we must reflect on mental beings, i.e., those beings that fall in the domain of psychology. Secondly, it provides a principle for the unification of a systematic body of psychological laws. In consequence, by approaching the object of psychology from the perspective of the self-conscious subject, who––in virtue of being capable of inner experience––first constitutes a psychological reality, Kant’s theory offers an attractive alternative to reductionist conceptions of psychology. (shrink)

Kant's theory of cognition centrally builds on his conception of self‐consciousness and the transcendental use of the phrase “I think”: the ability to add the phrase “I think” to a representation is a necessary condition of the ability to cognize objects. The paper argues that “I think”, rather than denoting the content of a predicative judgement, is typically an expression of the subject's thinking. It expresses a kind of self‐consciousness that, without assertively representing the subject itself, indicates that representational contents (...) are unified in a single consciousness of a single subject. Our aim is thus to develop and defend an expressivist interpretation of Kant's “I think”. (shrink)

With the outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), global researchers were confronted with major challenges. The German National Pandemic Cohort Network (NAPKON) was launched in fall 2020 to effectively leverage resources and bundle research activities in the fight against the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. We analyzed the setup phase of NAPKON as an example for multicenter studies in Germany, highlighting challenges and optimization potential in connecting 59 university and nonuniversity study sites. We examined the ethics application (...) process of 121 ethics submissions considering durations, annotations, and outcomes. Study site activation and recruitment processes were investigated and related to the incidence of SARS-CoV-2 infections. For all initial ethics applications, the median time to a positive ethics vote was less than two weeks and 30 of these study sites (65%) joined NAPKON within less than three weeks each. Electronic instead of postal ethics submission (9.5 days (Q1: 5.75, Q3: 17) vs. 14 days (Q1: 11, Q3: 26), p value = 0.01) and adoption of the primary ethics vote significantly accelerated the ethics application process. Each study center enrolled a median of 37 patients during the 14-month observation period, with large differences depending on the health sector. We found a positive correlation between recruitment performance and COVID-19 incidence as well as hospitalization incidence. Our analysis highlighted the challenges and opportunities of the federated system in Germany. Digital ethics application tools, adoption of a primary ethics vote and standardized formal requirements lead to harmonized and thus faster study initiation processes during a pandemic. (shrink)

Katharina Kraus’ Kant on Self-Knowledge and Self-Formation is a masterful work on Kant’s theoretical philosophy and an important contribution to the philosophy of mind. Navigating critical problems regarding self-consciousness and inner sense relevant to contemporary debates on phenomenal content and the transparency of experience, Kraus’ book serves as an indispensable resource for Kant scholarship.

Kraus’s book is both deep and wide-ranging. My comments focus on her account of Kant on self-awareness – both a priori and empirical apperception. Basic to her account is what she calls the hylomorphism of mental faculties in Kant. Kraus distinguishes her ‘reflexive’ account of apperception from both ‘logical’ and ‘psychological’ accounts. An inevitable question is: Does Kant think we have an empirical cognition of the self? Kraus seems to want to say yes, but I question this (...) answer. Cognition requires both intuition and conception. My claim is that it requires intuition in both space and time, but inner empirical self-awareness is apparently in time only. Kant’s Refutation of Idealism in B, as developed later in the Kiesewetter essays, makes awareness of our body essential to time determination. (shrink)

According to conventional wisdom, Kant demolished the traditional idea of the soul in his Critique of Pure Reason. By denying the human mind any theoretical or intuitive knowledge of the soul as an immaterial substance and referring this idea to an illusory tendency of the mind, he efficiently tore down a longstanding metaphysical discipline called rational psychology. Katherina Kraus’s aim is to challenge this conventional reading. In her new book Kant on Self-Knowledge and Self-Formation, she claims that Kant’s true (...) intention was to transform rather than demolish the idea of the immaterial soul. Her main argument, nourished by a close reading of the Critique of Pure Reason, is that despite this transformation... (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 29, Issue 3, Page 679-682, September 2021.

Kraus’s book is a rich and systematic examination of Kant’s account of the different dimensions of the metaphysics, epistemology and phenomenology of the ‘self’ that pertains to human subjectivity. Here I explore some of the different meanings that Kraus associates with the term ‘self’ on Kant’s behalf, asking for further clarification as to her interpretation of the terms ‘subject’ (‘the I’), ‘soul’ and ‘person’, in particular. I also raise some critical questions concerning Kraus’s account of the nature (...) and limitations of the ‘real’ use of the concept of the soul in particular, in light of passages throughout the Critical period in which Kant seems to allow for a relatively unproblematic application of the term to whatever being it is that possesses the various psychical faculties – a being which he also seems to allow is an object of experience (and hence cognition). (shrink)

These remarks focus on Kraus’s claim that for Kant the category of substance cannot apply to the soul but that instead we can and should apply a merely regulative idea of the soul. While granting Kraus’s contention that we require an idea of the soul in order to investigate inner experience, I argue that the category of substance nonetheless applies to the soul, but that the notion of the soul as entirely non-corporeal is a regulative idea. To explore (...) this contention, I closely examine two crucial passages Kraus uses to argue against parity between inner and outer sense. (shrink)

I raise three related objections to aspects of Katharina Kraus’s interpretation in Kant on Self-Knowledge and Self-Formation. First, I reject her claim that representations count as merely subjectively valid for Kant if they represent objects from the contingent perspective of a particular subject. I argue that Kant in fact describes consciousness of subjectively valid representations as consciousness of one’s own perceptions rather than of the objects perceived, and therefore that it plays a bigger role in his account of (...) self-consciousness than Kraus allows. Second, whereas Kraus argues that the transcendental unity of apperception structures the content of any consciousness that is possible for a subject, I note that Kant also allows for a merely empirical unity of apperception, which he describes as in principle different from transcendental unity. Finally, I raise some worries for Kraus’s suggestion that we can be aware of the activity of thinking through inner sense. (shrink)

Many legal, social, and medical theorists and practitioners, as well as lay people, seem to be concerned with the harmfulness of discriminative practices. However, the philosophical literature on the moral wrongness of discrimination, with a few exceptions, does not focus on harm. In this paper, I examine, and improve, a recent account of wrongful discrimination, which divides into a definition of group discrimination, and a characterisation of its moral wrong-making feature in terms of harm. The resulting account analyses the wrongness (...) of discrimination in terms of intrapersonal comparisons of the discriminatee’s actual, and relevantly counterfactual, well-being levels. I show that the account faces problems from counterfactuals, which can be traced back specifically to the orthodox - comparative, counterfactual, welfarist - concept of harm. I argue that non-counterfactual and non-comparative harm concepts face problems of their own, and don’t fit easily with our best understanding of discrimination; hence they are unsuitable to replace the orthodox concept here. I then propose a non-orthodox - comparative, counterfactual, hybrid - concept of harm, which relies on counterfactual comparisons of ways of being treated. I suggest how such a concept can help us handle the problems from counterfactuals, at least for my account of discrimination. I also show that there are similar proposals in other harm-related debates. An upshot of the paper is thus to corroborate the case for a non-orthodox, hybrid concept of harm, which seems better able to fulfil its functional roles in a variety of contexts. (shrink)

A realist view of numbers often rests on the following thesis: statements like ‘The number of moons of Jupiter is four’ are identity statements in which the copula is flanked by singular terms whose semantic function consists in referring to a number (henceforth: Identity). On the basis of Identity the realists argue that the assertive use of such statements commits us to numbers. Recently, some anti-realists have disputed this argument. According to them, Identity is false, and, thus, we may deny (...) that the relevant statements commit us to numbers. The present paper argues that the correct linguistic analysis of the relevant number statements supports the anti-realist view that Identity is false. However, as will further be shown, pace the anti-realist, this analysis does not establish that such statements do not commit us to numbers after all. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that ‘good care’ in residential nursing homes is enacted through different care practices that are either inspired by a ‘professional logic of care’ that aims for justice and non-maleficence in the professional treatment of residents, or by a ‘relational logic of care’, which attends to the relational quality and the meaning of interpersonal connectedness in people’s lives. Rather than favoring one care logic over the other, this paper indicates how important aspects of care are constantly (...) negotiated between different care practices. Based on the intricate everyday negotiations observed during an ethnographic field study at an elderly nursing home in Germany, the paper puts forth the argument that care is always a matter of tinkering with different, sometimes competing ‘goods’. This tinkering process, which unfolds through ‘intuitive deliberation’, ‘situated assessment’ and ‘affective juggling’ is then theorized along the conceptualization of a ‘practical ethics of care’: an ethics which makes no a priori judgments of what may be considered as good or bad care, but instead calls for momentary judgments that are pliable across changing situations. (shrink)

Problems arise when applying the current procedural conceptualization of decision-making capacity to paediatric healthcare: Its emphasis on content-neutrality and rational cognition as well as its implicit assumption that capacity is an ability that resides within a person jeopardizes children’s position in decision-making. The purpose of the paper is to challenge this dominant account of capacity and provide an alternative for how capacity should be understood in paediatric care. First, the influence of developmental psychologist Jean Piaget upon the notion of capacity (...) is discussed, followed by an examination of Vygostky’s contextualist view on children’s development, which emphasizes social interactions and learning for decision-making capacity. In drawing parallels between autonomy and capacity, substantive approaches to relational autonomy are presented that underline the importance of the content of a decision. The authors then provide a relational reconceptualization of capacity that leads the focus away from the individual to include important social others such as parents and physicians. Within this new approach, the outcome of adults’ decision-making processes is accepted as a guiding factor for a good decision for the child. If the child makes a choice that is not approved by adults, the new conceptualization emphasizes mutual exchange and engagement by both parties. (shrink)

These comments are my contribution to the author-meets-critics session on Katharina Kraus' recently published Kant on Self-Knowledge and Self-Formation, at the APA Pacific meeting. In my comments, I challenge Kraus' characterization of my fictionalism concerning the idea of the soul, and contend for the importance of transcendental illusion in that idea's function of guiding the empirical investigation of inner appearances.

When facing a choice between saving one person and saving many, some people have argued that fairness requires us to decide without aggregating numbers; rather we should decide by coin toss or some form of lottery, or alternatively we should straightforwardly save the greater number but justify this in a non-aggregating contractualist way. This paper expands the debate beyond well-known number cases to previously under-considered probability cases, in which not (only) the numbers of people, but (also) the probabilities of success (...) for saving people vary. It is shown that, in these latter cases, both the coin toss and the lottery lead to what is called an awkward conclusion, which makes probabilities count in a problematic way. Attempts to avoid this conclusion are shown to lead into difficulties as well. Finally, it is shown that while the greater number method cannot be justified on contractualist grounds for probability cases, it may be replaced by another decision method which is so justified. This decision method is extensionally equivalent to maximising expected value and seems to be the least problematic way of dealing with probability cases in a non-aggregating manner. (shrink)

Recent social‐psychological research suggests that a considerable amount of, for example, racial and gendered discrimination may be connected to implicit biases: mental processes beyond our direct control or endorsement, that influence our behaviour toward members of socially salient groups. In this article I seek to improve our understanding of the phenomenon of implicit bias, including its moral status, by examining it through the lens of a theory of discrimination. In doing so, I also suggest ways to improve this theory of (...) discrimination, by creating conceptual space for implicit bias discrimination. I explore two ways of distinguishing direct and indirect discrimination and spell out the resulting four different forms of discrimination. The resulting taxonomy provides some room for implicit bias discrimination. I also deal with four challenges to my proposal for capturing implicit bias within discrimination theory: the metaphysical challenge, the moral insignificance challenge, the causal connection challenge, and the challenge from irreducibly collective bias. (shrink)

Developmental psychology currently faces a deep puzzle: most children before 4 years of age fail elicited-response false-belief tasks, but preverbal infants demonstrate spontaneous false-belief understanding. Two main strategies are available: cultural constructivism and early-belief understanding. The latter view assumes that failure at elicited-response false-belief tasks need not reflect the inability to understand false beliefs. The burden of early-belief understanding is to explain why elicited-response false-belief tasks are so challenging for most children under 4 years of age. The goal of this (...) article is to offer a pragmatic framework whose purpose is to discharge this burden. (shrink)

Hume's explanation of our tendency to confuse calm passions with reason due to lack of feeling appears to present a tension with his claim that we cannot be mistaken about our own impressions. I argue that the calm/violent distinction cannot be understood in terms of presence/absence of feeling. Rather, for Hume the presence or absence of disruption and disordering of natural and/or customary modes of thought is the key distinction between the calm and violent passions. This reading provides new explanations (...) of our confusion of calm passions with reason, and the potential for calm passions to prevail over violent. (shrink)

Purpose: To explain physical activity behavior, social-cognitive theories were most commonly used in the past. Besides conscious processes, the approach of dual processes additionally incorporates non-conscious regulatory processes into physical activity behavior theories. Habits are one of various non-conscious variables that can influence behavior and thus play an important role in terms of behavior change. The aim of this review was to examine the relationship between habit strength and physical activity behavior in longitudinal studies.Methods: According to the PRISMA guidelines, a (...) systematic search was conducted in three databases. Only peer-reviewed articles using a longitudinal study design were included. Both, habit and physical activity were measured at least once, and habit was related to physical activity behavior. Study quality was evaluated by assessment tools of the NHLBI.Results: Of 3.382 identified publications between 2016 and 2019, fifteen studies with different study designs were included. Most studies supported that positive correlations between habit and physical activity exist. Some positive direct and indirect effects of habit on physical activity were detected and only a minority of studies showed the influence of physical activity on habit strength. Studies differentiating between instigation and execution habit found positive correlations and revealed instigation habit as a stronger predictor of physical activity. The quality of studies was rated as reasonable using assessment tools of the NHLBI.Conclusion: This review revealed a bidirectional relationship between habit and physical activity. Whether habit predicts physical activity or vice versa is still unclear. The observation of habit influencing physical activity may be most appropriate in studies fostering physical activity maintenance while the influence of physical activity on habit may be reasonable in experimental studies with physical activity as intervention content to form a habit. Future investigations should differentiate between habit formation and physical activity maintenance studies depending on the research objective. Long-term study designs addressing the complexity of habitual behavior would be beneficial for establishing cue-behavior associations for the formation of habits. Furthermore, studies should differentiate between instigation and execution habit in order to investigate the influence of both variables on physical activity behavior independently. (shrink)